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Protection of Intellectual Property Rights




The recent bolstering of intellectual property rights protection through innovative;trade initiatives such as the STOP! Program in the United States and the EU;Enforcement Directive and Action Plan are examined in this chapter. This chapter;is designed to provide a synopsis of the latest government policymakers tactics;designed to battle counterfeiters. The question of whether the STOP! Program in;the United States, the novel directive in the EU on enforcement, and the imminent;tactics of both the US and the EU targeted at third countries will reduce fakes is;a matter for future assessment. However, previous studies have already established;that enforcement of any type of government and/or multilateral agency sponsored;anti-counterfeiting strategy remains a leading concern in the continuing battle to;reduce the proliferation of fake goods.;7.2;US IPR Enforcement Initiatives;The advent of the Department of Homeland Security has changed the hierarchy of;governance of intellectual property rights in the United States. This department;now governs and/or is strategically aligned to several different agencies, such as the;US Secret Service and Customs and Border Protection (i.e., US Customs). The US;Secret Service was actually established in 1865 for the sole objective of suppressing;one of the oldest forms of piracy: counterfeit currency. The British counterfeited the;US currency during the American Revolution to make the local currency worthless;and not worth a Continental was a common expression at the time (http://www.; Figure 7.1 is a schematic showing the various agencies governing the IPR;environment in the US.;This diagram of US agencies is just the beginning of understanding the various;layers of government sectors involved in the protection of intellectual property;rights. A good example of the labyrinth of strategic alliances is the Intellectual;Property Rights Training Program Database ( sponsored;P. Chaudhry and A. Zimmerman, The Economics of Counterfeit Trade;DOI-10.1007/978-3-540-77835-6_7, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009;93;94;7;Changing Trade Policy;Fig. 7.1 Major players in US IPR enforcement;by the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs within the US Department of;State. The members of this program are: US Department of State, US Department;of Commerce (includes the International Trade Administration and Commercial;Law Development), the US Department of Justice (Office of Overseas Prosecutorial;Development Assistance & Training, Criminal Division and Computer Crime and;Intellectual Property Section, Criminal Division), US Department of Homeland;Security (Bureau of Customs and Border Protection), Federal Bureau of;Investigation, US Agency for International Development, Office of the US Trade;Representative, US Patent and Trademark Office, and Copyright Office of the Library;of Congress. To this list of government agencies, the following private sector;organizations also provide IPR-related information programs, training and technical;assistance to foreign officials and policy makers: Coalition of Intellectual Property;Rights (CIPR), Interactive Digital Software Association (ISDA), International;Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition (IACC), International Intellectual Property Alliance;(IIPA), International Intellectual Property Right Institute (IIPI), and Pharmaceutical;Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA).;The question becomes how many of the already established agencies will interface;with the recent STOP! Program and the National Intellectual Property Rights;Coordination Center in Washington, DC. The latest IPR center is supervised by the;Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and is supposed to coordinate a;unified response regarding IPR enforcement issues through core staffing from ICE;7.2;US IPR Enforcement Initiatives;95;and the FBI particular emphasis is given to investigating major criminal organizations and those using the Internet to facilitate IPR crime (;7.2.1;Strategy Targeting Organized Piracy;On October 4, 2004, several US government officials from the Department of Homeland;Security, the US Trade Representative (USTR), the Department of Commerce, and the;Department of Justice provided information on the new Strategy Targeting Organized;Piracy (STOP!) in an effort to build anti-counterfeiting coalitions with governments and;the private sectors in foreign markets. In a press release, (former) Commerce Secretary;Donald L. Evans described the evolution of STOP! as;[W]eve been pushing the door closed on fakes for three years and today [2004], were working;towards slamming it shut. Todays STOP! initiative allows us to leverage our experience and;integrate government resources to better protect Americas intellectual property in a systematic;way. Why now? We recognized, for some time, that we need to take intellectual property;protection to the next level and STOP! is the weapon that will get us there. Were elevating our;cooperation between the federal government, the private sector, and many of our trading;partners in an aggressive, unified effort against piracy and intellectual property rights theft.;(Evans, 2004);The US State Department has allocated funds in Phase 1 and 2 of the STOP!;program ($1.31 million and $1.19 million respectively) to assist projects to deter;intellectual property theft in Brazil, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Panama;and the like (Ereli, 2004). The main focus of each program is to train the indigenous;police, prosecutors, and customs officials in each country/region in order to effectively;investigate and prosecute infringements of intellectual property rights. However, a;review of the monetary grants for each country/region questions whether this level;of funding is going to assist companies in reducing the trade in counterfeits.;For example, the region of China / East-Asia Pacific receives the largest amount of;funding of $210,000 while the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, and Panama were;awarded $75,000 each. This is a paltry amount of funding when compared to the;magnitude of losses of intellectual property rights in these countries and/or regions;and in comparison to company-level funding of anti-counterfeiting tactics. For example;in 2003, LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton SA spent an estimated $14.5 million;to battle the pirates (Passariello, 2004). Thus, as illustrated in Table 7.1, managers;must understand that this type of financial support from the State Department will not;effectively deter the growth of counterfeits in the global marketplace.;In a 2004 report prepared by the United States Trade Representative office;agency officials outline the key elements of the STOP! Program as;Helping and empowering American businesses, investors and innovators, particularly small businesses, secure and enforce their rights in overseas markets;Ensuring consumer safety by securing Americas borders and marketplace from;fakes;Raising the stakes and making life more onerous for intellectual property thieves;through new customs methods that increase costs to violators far beyond seizing;96;7;t.1;Table 7.1 Intellectual property training programs;t.2;Program;Changing Trade Policy;Level of Funding ($);Tri-border initiative (Paraguay, Argentina and Brazil) 100,000;Brazil;100,000;China East-Asia Pacific;210,000;Pakistan;150,000;African Regional;150,000;US Government DVD Industry;100,000;Republic of Korea;75,000;Malaysia;75,000;Panama;75,000;Interpol;150,000;Source: US Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law;Enforcement Affairs, 2004;t.3;t.4;t.5;t.6;t.7;t.8;t.9;t.10;t.11;t.12;t.13;t.14;shipments and by naming and shaming global pirates and counterfeiting who are;producing and trafficking in fakes;Developing a No Trade in Fakes program in cooperation with the private sector to ensure that global supply chains are free of infringing goods;Working to dismantle criminal enterprises that steal intellectual property using;all appropriate criminal laws, and overhauling, updating and modernizing US;intellectual property statutes;Joining forces with like-minded trading partners concerned about the growing;global IPR piracy problem, such as the European Commission, Japan, the United;Kingdom and France who have all launched initiatives (United States Trade;Representative, 2004, 4);The US Department of Commerce will specifically establish a hotline that provides a;one-stop-shop for businesses to protect their intellectual property at home and;abroad - 1-866-999-HALT, build a bridge between companies and US Customs to;block bogus goods at the border, develop a comprehensive web-based guide for;American innovators and businesses on how to safeguard their ideas and innovations, and challenge industry leaders to develop voluntary guidelines/corporate;compliance programs to ensure that their supply chains are free of trade in fakes;(Strategy targeting, 2004). Robert Zoellick, (former) US Trade Representative;began a name and shame tactic to identify firms that are producing and trafficking;in fakes in the agencys Special 301 Report. Thus, the US government will start;publishing an annual list of firms (not just countries) that are known to be supplying;the counterfeit goods (United States State Department, 2004).;7.3;European Commission Taxation and Customs Union;On February 8, 2005 Lszl Kovcs, European Commissioner of Taxation and;Customs Union, stated that, counterfeiting undermines competitiveness, destroys;jobs and threatens the health and security of citizens around the world. EU Customs;7.4;IPR Enforcement Initiatives in the European Union;97;are in the forefront of this battle and, according to our understanding, seize more;fakes than any other enforcement agency in the world (Kovcs, 2005, 1).;Mr. Kovcs also reported that his agency has seen a 900% increase in the number;of cases of counterfeits in the past 4 years and that these seizures really represent;just the tip of the fake iceberg that is estimated to be worth 400 billion Euros;(Kovcs, 2005). In 2004, the European Union (EU) had experienced rapid growth;of counterfeits in the number of cases registered by product type and EU seizure;data reveal dramatic percentage increases in the sectors of foodstuffs and alcohol;(+197%), clothing (+102%), electrical equipment (+707%), and computer equipment (+899%) (European Commission, 2005c). In April 2004, in an effort to curb;the problem of counterfeit cigarettes and the subsequent loss of significant government tax revenue in the EU (estimated at hundreds of millions of dollars per year;in lost tax revenue), Philip Morris International, Inc. agreed to pay nearly $1 billion;over a 12-year time frame to assist the EU government develop new procedures;to curb the counterfeiting and smuggling of cigarettes in this region (Philip;Morris to back EU, 2004). For a detailed overview of US seizure data, refer back;to Chapters 2 and 3.;The parallel agency to the US Customs and Border Protection is the European;Commissions Taxation and Customs Union. The best place to keep up-to-date;in government initiatives is at;customs_controls/counterfeit_piracy/index_en.htm (European Commission, 2005d).;Various data are presented at this website in terms of both EU and specific Member;States information regarding seizure data. In 2008, the EU reported that its 2007;seizure data comprised of two large categories: cigarettes (34%) and clothing;(22%). The EU government also raised alarming statistics (compared to 2006 data);that seizures in personal care products (+264%), toys (+98%), foodstuffs (+62%);computer equipment (+62%) and medicines (+51%) had dramatically increased in;a 1-year time frame.;7.4;IPR Enforcement Initiatives in the European Union;The EU currently has nine distinct directives that govern some aspect of intellectual;property rights. As illustrated in Table 7.2, three of these directives specifically;have power over the sectors of satellite and cable, computer programs and;semiconductors.;For a more detailed synopsis of each of these directives, consult the European;Commission website at or order the European Commission;publication on EC Directives on Copyright and Related Rights at http://ec.;;For the purposes of this chapter, we would like to focus on the new directive;related to set minimum enforcement standards in the EU that was adopted on;April 29, 2004.;98;7;Changing Trade Policy;t.1;Table 7.2 List of EU directives on IPR;t.2;Name of directive;Brief description;Adoption date;Enforcement;Harmonizes enforcement procedures for member;states;Resale rights for the benefit of the author of an;original work of art;Harmonizes certain aspects of copyright and related;rights in the information society;Legal protection of data bases;Harmonizes the term of protection of copyright and;certain related rights;Coordination of certain rules concerning copyrights;in this industry;Governance of rental right and lending rights;related to copyright;Legal protection of computer programs;29.04.2004;t.3;t.4;t.5;t.6;t.7;t.8;t.9;t.10;t.11;t.12;t.13;t.14;t.15;t.16;t.17;t.18;t.19;Resale right;Copyright in the;information society;Protection of databases;Term of protection;Satellite and cable;Rental right;Protection of computer;programs;Semiconductors;Legal protection of topographies of semiconductors;products;27.09.2001;22.05.2001;11.03.1996;29.10.1993;27.09.1993;19.11.1992;14.05.1991;16.12.1999;Source:, 2005;7.4.1;Retaliation: Understanding the New Enforcement Directive;in the EU to Pursue Counterfeiters;Of the nine directives mentioned in the last section, the first directive governs the;rental and lending rights related to copyright protection and was adopted into EU;legislation in November 1992. Thus, in relative terms, this supranational government agency has just begun to develop and adopt EU-wide measures to protect a;companys intellectual property rights. The current policy changes center on the;new Enforcement Directive that was adopted on April 29, 2004 to establish minimum enforcement of intellectual property right standards in the EU.;The 10 new Member States which joined the EU on May 1, 2004 were Cyprus;the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia;and Slovenia. Thus, one of the major reasons to adopt a directive on the enforcement;of IPR in the EU was to strengthen the ability to fight the counterfeit traffickers in;Member States with weak enforcement regimes. However, there was debate as;to whether the new directive provided enough incentive for these ten Member States to;protect intellectual property rights. Phillips, in his 2004 article on intellectual property;enforcement describes the legal quagmire for protection of IPR in the EU as;[E]nlargement means that, with respect to pan-European IP rights such as the Community;trade mark and the Community design, the same right may be the subject of dispute in up;to 25 jurisdictions. If the IP right dispute involves a substantial number of jurisdictions;almost anything is preferable to litigating the same dispute simultaneously in a large;number of different countries (sic) (p. 1).;7.4;IPR Enforcement Initiatives in the European Union;99;Table 7.3 Synopsis of EU directive of IPR;Scope of directive;t.1;Sets minimum standards for enforcement by reference to best practice in;the member states;Applies to infringements of any IP rights arising from community or;national law regardless of the degree of harmonization of the;underlying rights;Three measures - relating to orders for the disclosure of certain types of evidence, orders for the disclosure of information, and freezing orders - apply;only where the act of infringement is carried out on a commercial sale;Criminal sanctions are left up to the member states that must apply;penalties that are effective, dissuasive and proportionate;t.2;t.3;t.4;t.5;t.6;t.7;t.8;t.9;t.10;t.11;All member states will have to adapt their legislation to a greater or lesser;degree to meet the new requirements in terms of;Disclosure of evidence;Search and seizure orders;Seizure of infringing goods;Injunction against an intermediary;Freezing orders;Damages;Corrective measure;Cash alternative for innocent infringers;Source: Knapper (2004) and the Economist Intelligence Unit (2004);t.12;t.13;t.14;t.15;t.16;t.17;t.18;t.19;t.20;t.21;Impact on member;states;The major provisions of the EU directive in terms of its scope and impact on;Member States is summarized in Table 7.3 The directive does not harmonize but;sets minimum standards for enforcement in current Member States. For a more;detailed legal evaluation of the directive, review Knapper (2004) and European;Commission (2004).;At a 2005 press conference in Brussels, Belgium, Lszl Kovcs, European;Commissioner of Taxation and Customs Union outlined the leading tactics of the;new Enforcement Directive for key players, such as business, EU Customs, and the;international and national government policymakers. Basically, this directive will;increase cooperation and information exchange in the business community to promote;a better dialogue with key players such as shipping lines, express carriers, and airlines;to work with business to produce practical guides for customs and promote targeted;actions in high risk areas, to establish regular meetings with business to focus on;joint efforts, and to provide training for business on customs requirements. In addition;international actions would include using the customs co-operation agreements;to create feedback systems to cut off counterfeiting at the source, and increased;partnership with other international organizations such as the World Customs;Organization and Interpol (Kovcs, 2005).;In terms of the scope of this Enforcement Directive, the legislation sets minimum;standards for enforcement by reference to best practice in the Member States;applies to infringements of any IPR arising from Community or national law regardless of the degree of harmonization of the underlying rights, establishes three;measures relating to orders for the disclosure of certain types of evidence;100;7;Changing Trade Policy;orders for the disclosure of information, and freezing orders that apply only where;the act of infringement is carried out on a commercial sale, and appeals to the 25;Member States to develop criminal sanctions that must apply penalties that are;effective, dissuasive and proportionate (European Commission, 2004). In terms of;the impact of this new directive on the protection of intellectual property rights in;each Member State, the national governments must adapt the legislation to a greater;or lesser degree to meet the new requirements of the Enforcement Directive.;Knapper (2004) described the controversy that embroiled the adoption of this;directive noted that the scope of the directive was too broad in terms of its application;to consumer piracy, such as file-swapping, and for introducing criminal measures;outside the jurisdiction of the European Commission. Again, this directive places the;burden on each Member State to change its legislation in terms of enforcement;mechanisms ranging from disclosure of evidence to damages. The Business Software;Alliance (BSA), the International Federation of Phonographic Industry (IFPI), the;Motion Picture Association, and the like, expressed a discouraged outlook regarding the level of protection given to intellectual property rights under this Directive;and stated that the Directive does not give adequate protection since the measures;proposed do not reach the level of protection offered in laws of certain Member;States (International Federation of the Phonographic Industry, 2005). Therefore;whether this directive alleviates the piracy problem remains to be seen.;One of the major reasons to adopt a directive on the enforcement of IPR in the;EU was to strengthen the ability to fight the counterfeit traffickers in Member;States with weak enforcement regimes. According to the Economist Intelligence;Unit, the enlargement of the EU in 2004 was one of the major reasons that the EU;quickly adopted this new directive.;7.4.2;Seeking Retribution: The European Commission Develops;Action Plan to Deter Pirates;In October 2005, the European Commission announced an Action Plan to further;strengthen the level of intellectual property rights protection in the trade bloc. The;policymakers were disturbed by recently released seizure data that reveals a significant growth in the counterfeit trade, an estimated increase of 1,000% from 1998 in;terms of reported cases of pirated goods (European Commission, 2005c). In addition, the government decision-makers were concerned with the health and safety of;consumers due to the consumption of fake foodstuffs, medicines, household items;and car parts. Thus, the Commissions Action Plan includes the following proposed;measures;A new business-customs working group to consider whether there is a need to;refine EU anti-counterfeit legislation in order to increase protection for legitimate;business while keeping down costs.;A new Task Force of Member States Customs experts with the task of improving;anti-counterfeiting controls.;7.4;IPR Enforcement Initiatives in the European Union;101;The completion of an anti-counterfeiting risk management guide to be distributed to Member States as well as to our international partners.;A new electronic system of secure, real-time transmission of information.;A memorandun of understanding with major trade representatives such as airlines;shipping companies and express carriers with a view to improving information;exchange and creating a better awareness of the risks posed by the traffic in fakes.;With regard to reinforcing international co-operation, the Commission will;together with Member States, consider possible amendments to the World Trade;Organization Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement so that countries;apply anti-counterfeiting controls not only on imports but also on exports, transit;and transshipment movements (European Commission, 2005b, 3).;Immediately after this 2005 press release, Francis Moore, Regional Director of;Europe for the IFPI, the organization representing the recording industry worldwide;enthusiastically supported this Action Plan by stating that it is a multi-pronged;approach which for the first time is commensurate with the size of the problem.;For the music industry, the pirate market is estimated to be worth $4.6 billion at;pirate prices worldwide (IFPI, 2005, 1). A current example of the potential for;future multi-agency cooperation is the successful EU joint customs operation;codenamed FAKE. This sting operation was conducted during a 2-week period in;May 2005 where counterfeit products of Chinese origin were monitored through 250;customs officers in the EU throughout the 25 Member States. The FAKE project was;coordinated by both the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and the EU Taxation;and Customs Union. This first joint operation was extremely successful in seizing;counterfeit goods through the timely exchange of information between Customs;Officials in order to detect fake products in commercial transactions entering the;majority of the EUs borders (International customs operation FAKE, 2005).;7.4.3;EUUS Action Strategy for the Enforcement of Intellectual;Property Rights;On June 21, 2006, at the US-EU Summit in Vienna, government officials endorsed the;EU-US Action Strategy for the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights. The;main objectives of this joint effort were to curb the growth of counterfeit trade by way;of promoting strict enforcement, strengthening bilateral cooperation, and fostering;public-private partnerships to protect intellectual property. The United States Mission;to the European Union summarizes the main points of this bilateral agreement in the;key areas of enforcement and public-private partnerships as follows (US, EU Adopt;Action Strategy for the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 2006);1. Enforcement;(a) Customs and Border Control;Increase cooperation to strengthen border enforcement of IP rights, taking fully;into account the five-point plan agreed in the framework of the Joint Customs;102;7;Changing Trade Policy;Cooperation Committee (JCCC) by exchanging IPR border enforcement practices and experiences, operational staff to jointly target and examine shipments;enforcement information on IPR seizures and trends enhancing targeting and;controls for counterfeit goods posing health and safety or security risks is a;priority for cooperation in this area.;(b) Bilateral measures;Step up our actions to encourage third countries to enforce IPR and to combat counterfeiting and piracy. This should be done inter alia through coordinated efforts that draw upon information from industry, coordinated;messages on key enforcement issues and active complementing of each others bilateral efforts working with third countries, and exchange of information about significant IP-related meetings and other events that provide;opportunities to advance these objectives.;(c) Multilateral measures;Facilitate the ongoing OECD IP study by providing data and any other necessary and available resources, recognizing that current, independent and;reliable information on the scope and effects of IP theft will shape a more;compelling pro-IP enforcement message for consumers and governments;worldwide. Support implementation of the 2005 G8 Leaders Statement on;Reducing IPR Piracy and Counterfeiting through more effective enforcement;in particular in the area of the fight against criminal infringements of IP;rights to reduce substantially global trade in pirated and counterfeit goods.;2. Promoting public-private partnership;Involve industry by providing information on IPR related meetings and activities in;third countries, to launch joint public-private roundtable discussions in third countries, to assist small and medium sized enterprises with IPR protection and enforcement challenges in third countries, and to increase public awareness of the need to;address IPR infringements at trade fairs and share ideas on ways to improve enforcement against such infringements, in cooperation with the interested parties.;The agreement also invites industry to enhance a public-private relationship by;sharing information with government authorities, sharing IP strategies in terms of;industry model to curb counterfeit trade, divulging enforcement problems in third;countries, and giving government officials an idea of what type of public awareness;programs have been designed to educate the consumer on the illicit trade. For a;more detailed report of each measure, consult the United States Mission to the EU;website at;7.4.4;Operation Infrastructure;In February 2008, both the EU and US authorities released the information that;Operation Infrastructure was the first successful outcome of the new EU-US Action;7.4;IPR Enforcement Initiatives in the European Union;103;Strategy (United States Customs and Border Protection and European Commission;Announce First Joint Operation Combating Counterfeit Goods, 2008). The CBP;and the TAXUD selected semiconductors and computer networking equipment for;their first joint IPR border enforcement action. These categories were selected since;in addition to IPR infringement, the counterfeit goods in this area also represent;safety and security risks. The US customs and Border Protection and the European;Commission report that counterfeit hardware lacks the quality assurance and manufacturing standards of genuine hardware. As a result, there is a much higher failure;rate for counterfeit hardware. Many counterfeit products fail on installation and;more fail weeks or months after installation. Failures impose significant labor;equipment and lost productivity costs on individuals and organizations that;depend on these networks (U.S. Customs and Border Protection and European;Union Announce Joint Operation in Combating Pirated Goods, 2008, 6).;Operation Infrastructure was a 2-month joint operation conducted in November;and December 2007 that led to the seizure of over 360,000 illicit computer central;processing chips and circuit boards that had been shipped from primarily China;Taiwan and Hong Kong. The fake merchandise contained the brand names of over;40 leading manufacturers in this sector, including Intel, Cisco, Philips Electronics;Siemens and the like. EU and US authorities in Operation Infrastructure worked;closely with key airports in the US and EU and air freight operators, such as Federal;Express, United Parcel Service, and DHL to detect the counterfeit merchandise;(US, EU Team Up to Crack Down or Computer Counterteits, n.d.).;In February 2008, Mr. R. Verrue, Director General for Taxation and Customs at the;European Commission, stated: We will continue to build upon this operation and a;growing cooperation with our US colleagues to combat the global trade in fake goods.;The EU and US are fully committed to combating counterfeiting and piracy at home;and abroad. In addition, this also shows that Customs administrations are prepared to;tackle difficult enforcement challenges and issues, especially when the health and safety;of our citizens is at stake (United States Customs and Border Protection and European;Commission Announce First Joint Operation Combating Counterfeit Goods, 2008;2). CBP Assistant Commissioner Baldwin mirrored his counterparts comments by stating, The success of Operation Infrastructure clearly demonstrates our commitment to;jointly working with our European counterparts to stop the international flow of illicit;goods, and protect our consumers and businesses from these harmful products;(United States Customs and Border Protection and European Commission Announce;First Joint Operation Combating Counterfeit Goods, 2008, 4).;7.4.5;EU Third-Country IPR Enforcement Strategy;In November 2004, the European Commission released its new tactics for enforcing;intellectual property rights beyond its borders in third countries. Pascal Lamy, the;(former) EU Trade Commissioner states, [P]iracy and counterfeiting continue to;grow every year and have become industries, increasingly run by criminal organizations.;This is a serious problem for us but also for third countries whose companies;104;7;Changing Trade Policy;are also suffering the consequences of violation of their intellectual property rights.;Some of these fakes, like pharmaceuticals and foodstuffs constitute an outright;danger to the public, while others undermine the survival of the EUs most innovative sectors, confronted with the misappropriation of their creations. Adopting new;legislation on intellectual property is one thing. But devising the right tools to;enforce it is another. This is now our priority. (European Union, 2004).;In July 2003, the European Commission conducted a detailed survey that assessed;the enforcement issues of intellectual property rights in third countries. The results;of this study found the most difficult countries were China, Thailand, Ukraine;Russia, Indonesia, Brazil, Turkey and South Korea in terms of both the export and;domestic consumption of counterfeit goods. The major tactics of this new trade;strategy towards third-country IPR infringement is to;Identify priority countries: EU action will focus on the most problematic countries in terms of IPR violations. These countries will be identified according to;a regular survey to be conducted by the Commission among all stakeholders.;Awareness raising: Promote initiatives to raise public awareness about the;impact of counterfeiting (e.g., loss of foreign investment and risks to health).;Political dialogue, incentives and technical cooperation: Ensuring that technical;assistance provided to third countries focuses on IPR enforcement, especially in;priority countries. Exchanging ideas and information with other agencies, such;as the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the US or Japan, with;the aim of avoiding duplication of efforts and sharing best-practices.;IPR mechanisms in multilateral (including TRIPS), bi-regional and bilateral;agreements: Raising enforcement concerns in the framework, consulting trading;partners in terms of an initiative with the WTO TRIPS Council, and the like.;Dispute settlement - sanctions: Recall the possibility that right-holders have to;make use of the Trade Barriers Regulation or of bilateral agreements, in cases of;evidence of violations of TRIPS.;Creation of public-private partnerships: supporting


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