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Stephen Galls suit can not be dismissed on the strength of Utilitys argument




Case Law2;Stephen Galls suit can not be dismissed on the strength of Utilitys argument that;water is not goods under UCC, because courts interpreted supply of water as sale of goods;under UCC. Relevant case law is furnished below;City's Sale of Water to Meat Processor Was Sale of Goods Under the UCC;In an action brought by a meat processing company against a city for negligence and;breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, alleging that the water that;the city supplied to the meat processing company contained a foreign substance harmful to;its business, the South Dakota Supreme Court has ruled that the city's furnishing of water;to the meat processing company was a sale of goods under Article 2 of the Uniform;Commercial Code ("UCC"). Dakota Pork Indus. v. City of Huron, 638 N.W.2d 884, 886;(S.D. 2002).;The court explained that "[t]he primary inquiry is whether [the] City's furnishing of water to;Dakota Pork constitutes a sale of goods under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code;(UCC)." Id. at *6. It also explained that in Canavan v. City of Mechanicville, 128 N.E. 882 (N.Y.;1920),the New York Court of Appeals examined the sale of water under the Uniform Sales Act.;Case Law3;Under that Act, goods were defined in part as "all chattels personal other than things in action or;money." The court held that "[t]he furnishing of water, through a system of waterworks, by a;water corporation, either private or municipal, to private consumers, at a fixed compensation, is a;sale of goods within the meaning of the statute.... It is a sale of goods as if the water were;collected and delivered in bottles for a price.;References;[1.]Dakota Pork Indus. v. City of Huron, 638 N.W.2d 884, 886 (S.D. 2002);;[2.]Canavan v. City of Mechanicville, 128 N.E. 882 (N.Y. 1920);;Unjust enrichment embodies a general equitable principle that no person should be;allowed to profit at another's expense without making restitution for the reasonable value of any;property, services, or other benefits that have been unfairly received and retained;Unjust enrichment has three elements. First, the plaintiff must have provided the;defendant with something of value while expecting compensation in return. Second, the;defendant must have acknowledged, accepted, and benefited from whatever the plaintiff;provided. Third, the plaintiff must show that it would be inequitable or Unconscionable for the;defendant to enjoy the benefit of the plaintiff's actions without paying for it. A court will closely;Case Law4;examine the facts of each case before awarding this remedy and will deny claims for unjust;enrichment that frustrate public policy or violate the law.;Present case: Since Schumacher enjoyed the profits of the bar and restaurant without paying;anything to the actual owners, he can not take recourse to principle of unjust enrichment. His;plea is likely to be dismissed.;Case law;DESERT MIRIAH INC v. AUTO INC;DESERT MIRIAH, INC., Plaintiff and Appellee, v. B & L AUTO, INC., and Floyd L. Denning;Defendants and Appellants.;990448.No.;-- October 24, 2000;References;[1.] Calamari, John D., and Joseph M. Perillo. 1999. Contracts. 3d ed. St. Paul, Minn.: West.;[2.] Dagan, Hanoch. 1997. Unjust Enrichment: A Study of Private Law and Public Values. New;York: Cambridge Univ. Press.;[3] Hurd, Heidi M. 2003. "Nonreciprocal Risk Imposition, Unjust Enrichment, and the;Foundations of Tort Law: A Critical Celebration of George Fletcher's Theory of Tort Law.;Notre Dame Law Review 78 (April).;Case Law5;No, the contention of the church that the contract was concluded on June 4, is not;correct. After receiving the offer on June 4, the church accepted the offer with modifications.;The reply of the church, in fact, was a counter offer to Pernal. Pernal sent his acceptance for the;amended offer on June 10 and till that is accepted by the church afresh the contract will not be;concluded.;As per contract law, Acceptance of an offer means unconditional agreement to all the terms of;that offer. If you are to accept an offer, you must accept an offer exactly, without modifications;if you change the offer in any way, this is a counter-offer that kills the original offer.;References;[1.]Hyde v. Wrench (1840);[2.] Commisioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597, 68 S. Ct. 715, 719, 92 L.Ed. 898.;(1948);Cantus resignation was accepted by San Benito Superintendent of schools on June 18;itself and communicated to Cantu on the same date. The acceptance was also communicated;when the letter of acceptance was posted with proper stamping.;In this case Cantu is the offeror and the superintendent is the acceptor. When the;resignation was accepted the contract was concluded.;The argument of Cantu that mailbox rule should not be applied to her because she;handed over her withdrawal of resignation in person is not tenable.;References;Case Law6;[1.] Powell v. Lee (1908) 99 LT 284.;[2.] Robophone Facilities Ltd v. Blank (1966) 3 All E.R. 128.;The contract law prescribes that the contract should be in writing. In the absence of;written contracts, it is very difficult to prove the conclusion contracts when the matters go to;courts.;In the present case Tinker Constructions promise to Scorge of bonus if the factory;addition is completed on schedule is oral. Similarly his promise to the supplier of machinery to;pay higher price for the machinery was also oral. There is nothing to prove his promises when;taken to court of law. So the promises were not enforceable.;Legal experts opine that oral contracts should be held valid in construction contracts.;There are cases where the courts have accepted oral contracts in construction cases but those;cases involve tangible evidence. In this case the oral agreements are regarding the time and price;which are intangibles. So the oral agreements are not enforceable.;References;[1.]Brian Royle Maggs-V-Guy;[2.] Marsh and others, CA 7 July 2006;;Case Law7


Paper#32716 | Written in 18-Jul-2015

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