Description of this paper

What is the main difference between an assignment and a novation?




What is the main difference between an assignment and a novation?;1) In a novation the original obligor is completely discharged from his/her obligations under the contract.;2) In a novation the original obligee is completely discharged from his/her obligations under the contract.;3) In a novation the original obligor remains secondarily obligated.;4) In a novation both the original obligee and the original obligor remain obligated.;Select the correct answer from the choices above.;Business Law;Attachment Preview;Business Law Chapter 16.pdf;MallorBarnesBowersLangvardt;Business Law: The Ethical;Global, and ECommerce;Environment, 13th Edition;III. Contracts;The McGrawHill;Companies, 2007;16. Writing;chapter 16;WRITING;oore went to First National Bank and requested the president of the bank to allow his adult sons, Rocky;and Mike, to open an account in the name of Texas Continental Express, Inc. Moore promised to bring;his own business to the bank and orally agreed to make good any losses that the bank might incur from;receiving dishonored checks from Texas Continental. The bank then furnished a regular checking account and;bank draft services to Texas Continental. Several years later, Texas Continental wrote checks totaling;$448,942.05 that were returned for insufficient funds. Texas Continental did not cover the checks and the bank;turned to Moore for payment.;M;Was Moores oral promise to pay Texas Continentals dishonored checks enforceable?;If not, what would have been required in the nature of a writing to make the promise enforceable?;Suppose there had been a written agreement between Moore and the bank: Would the bank have been able to;enforce an oral promise made by Moore that was not stated in the written contract?;Would it be ethical of Moore not to pay the bank?;YOUR STUDY OF CONTRACT law so far has focused;on the requirements for the formation of a valid contract.;You should be aware, however, that even when all the elements of a valid contract exist, the enforceability of the;contract and the nature of the parties obligations can be;greatly affected by the form in which the contract is set;out and by the language that is used to express the agreement. This chapter discusses the ways in which the enforceability of a contract and the scope of contractual;obligations can be affected by the manner in which people express their agreements.;The Significance of Writing;in Contract Law;Purposes of Writing;Despite what many people believe, there is no general requirement that contracts;be in writing. In most situations, oral contracts are legally;enforceable, assuming that they can be proven. Still, oral;contracts are less desirable than written contracts in;many ways. They are more easily misunderstood or forgotten than written contracts. They are also more subject;to the danger that a person might fabricate terms or;fraudulently claim to have made an oral contract when;none exists.;Writing is important in contract law and practice for;a number of reasons. When people memorialize their;contracts in a writing, they are enhancing their chances;of proving that an obligation was undertaken and making it harder for the other party to deny making the;promise. A persons signature on a written contract allows a basis for the contract to be authenticated, or;proved to be genuinely the contract of the signer. In addition, signing a writing also communicates to any of us;entering the contract the seriousness of the occasion.;Occasionally there are problems with proving the genuineness of the writing and often there are disagreements about the interpretation of language in a contract;but the written form is still very useful in increasing the;chances that you will be able to depend on the enforcement of your contracts.;Writing and Contract Enforcement;In;contract law, there are certain situations in which a;promise that is not in writing can be denied enforcement. In such situations, an otherwise valid contract can;become unenforceable if it does not comply with the;formalities required by state law. These situations are;MallorBarnesBowersLangvardt;Business Law: The Ethical;Global, and ECommerce;Environment, 13th Edition;III. Contracts;The McGrawHill;Companies, 2007;16. Writing;Chapter Sixteen Writing;controlled by a type of statute called the Statute of;Frauds.;Overview of the Statute;of Frauds;History and Purposes;In 17th-century England, the dangers inherent in oral contracts were exacerbated by a legal rule that prohibited parties to a lawsuit;from testifying in their own cases. Since the parties to an;oral contract could not give testimony, the only way they;could prove the existence of the contract was through the;testimony of third parties. As you might expect, third parties were sometimes persuaded to offer false testimony;about the existence of contracts. In an attempt to stop the;widespread fraud and perjury that resulted, Parliament;enacted the Statute of Frauds in 1677. It required written;evidence before certain classes of contracts would be enforced. Although the possibility of fraud exists in every;contract, the statute focused on contracts in which the potential for fraud was great or the consequences of fraud;were especially serious. The legislatures of American;states adopted very similar statutes, also known as statutes;of frauds. These statutes, which require certain kinds;of contracts to be evidenced by a signed writing, are;exceptions to the general rule that oral contracts are;enforceable.;Statutes of frauds have produced a great deal of litigation, due in part to the publics ignorance of their provisions. It is difficult to imagine an aspect of contract law;that is more practical for businesspeople to know about;than the circumstances under which an oral contract will;not suffice.;Effect of Violation of the Statute of;Frauds The statute of frauds applies only to executory contracts. If an oral contract has been completely;performed by both parties, the fact that it did not comply;with the statute of frauds would not be a ground for;rescission of the contract.;395;What happens if an executory contract is within the;statute of frauds but has not been evidenced by the type of;writing required by the statute? It is not treated as an illegal contract because the statute of frauds is more of a formal rule than a rule of substantive law. Rather, the contract;that fails to comply with the statute of frauds is unenforceable. Although the contract will not be enforced, a person;who has conferred some benefit on the other party pursuant to the contract can recover the reasonable value of his;performance in an action based on quasi-contract.;Contracts Covered by;the Statute of Frauds;A contract is said to be within (covered by) the statute;of frauds if the statute requires that sort of contract to be;evidenced by a writing. In almost all states, the following;types of contracts are within the statute of frauds;1. Collateral contracts in which a person promises to;perform the obligation of another person.;2. Contracts for the sale of an interest in real estate.;3. Bilateral contracts that cannot be performed within a;year from the date of their formation.;4. Contracts for the sale of goods for a price of $500;or more.;5. Contracts in which an executor or administrator;promises to be personally liable for the debt of an;estate.;6. Contracts in which marriage is the consideration.;Of this list, the first four sorts of contracts have the;most significance today, and our discussion will focus;primarily on them.;The statutes of frauds of the various states are not uniform. Some states require written evidence of other contracts in addition to those listed above. For example, a;number of states require written evidence of contracts to;pay a commission for the sale of real estate. Others require written evidence of ratifications of infantspromises;or promises to pay debts that have been barred by the;statute of limitations or discharged by bankruptcy.;The Global Business Environment;Under the CISG, there is no requirement that a;contract be evidenced by a writing. A contract;need not take any particular form, and can be proven;by any means. The CISG does permit parties to a written contract to require that any modifications of the contract be in;writing, however.;MallorBarnesBowersLangvardt;Business Law: The Ethical;Global, and ECommerce;Environment, 13th Edition;III. Contracts;396;The McGrawHill;Companies, 2007;16. Writing;Part Three Contracts;The following discussion examines in greater detail;the sorts of contracts that are within most states statute;of frauds.;Figure 1 Collateral Contract;Obligee;Collateral Contracts;A collateral contract is;one in which one person (the guarantor) agrees to pay the;debt or obligation that a second person (the principal;debtor) owes to a third person (the obligee) if the principal debtor fails to perform. For example, Cohn, who;wants to help Davis establish a business, promises First;Bank that he will repay the loan that First Bank makes to;Davis if Davis fails to pay it. Here, Cohn is the guarantor;Davis is the principal debtor, and First Bank is the;obligee. Cohns promise to First Bank must be in writing;to be enforceable.;Figure 1 shows that a collateral contract involves at;least three parties and at least two promises to perform (a;promise by the principal debtor to pay the obligee and a;promise by the guarantor to pay the obligee). In a collateral contract, the guarantor promises to pay only if the;principal debtor fails to do so. The essence of the collateral contract is that the debt or obligation is owed primarily by the principal debtor and the guarantors debt is;secondary. Thus, not all three-party transactions are collateral contracts.;When a person undertakes an obligation that is not;conditioned on the default of another person, and the;debt is his own rather than that of another person, his;obligation is said to be original, not collateral. For example, when Timmons calls Johnson Florist Company and;says, Send flowers to Elrod, Timmons is undertaking an;obligation to pay her ownnot someone elsesdebt.;When a contract is determined to be collateral, however, it will be unenforceable unless it is evidenced by a;writing. You will see an example of this principle in the;Wintersport case which follows below.;Exception: Main Purpose or Leading Object Rule;There are some situations in which a contract that is tech-;Primary contract;Collateral contract;Principal;debtor;Guarantor;Guarantors promise;must be evidenced;by a writing.;nically collateral is treated like an original contract because the person promising to pay the debt of another does;so for the primary purpose of securing some personal benefit. Under the main purpose or leading object rule, no;writing is required where the guarantor makes a collateral;promise for the main purpose of obtaining some personal;economic advantage. When the consideration given in exchange for the collateral promise is something the guarantor seeks primarily for his own benefit rather than for the;benefit of the primary debtor, the contract is outside the;statute of frauds and does not have to be in writing. Suppose, for example, that Penn is a major creditor of Widgetmart, a retailer. To help keep Widgetmart afloat and;increase the chances that Widgetmart will repay the debt it;owes him, Penn orally promises Rex Industries, one of the;Widgetmarts suppliers, that he will guarantee Widgetmarts payment for goods that Rex sells to Widgetmart. In;this situation, Penns oral agreement could be enforced under the main purpose rule if the court finds that Penn was;acting for his own personal financial benefit.;In the following Wintersport case, the court considers;whether the main purpose or leading object rule applies;to a shareholder who guarantees a corporations debt.;Wintersport Ltd. v., Inc.;2004 Wash. App. LEXIS 1071 (Ct. App. Wash. 2004) (unpublished opinion);Wintersport Ltd. contacted, Inc., to offer advertising, production, and printing services for Millionaire.coms;magazine, Opulence. Wintersport and entered into a $170,000 contract for the printing of one monthly issue;in October 2000. They performed that contract and entered negotiations to print the next months issue. David Strong, senior;vice-president of, and Ron Leiter, president of Wintersport, handled most of the negotiations and communications. Due to financial difficulties, reduced the size of its order for the second issue and requested payment terms on the reduced price of $80,000. Concerned about Millionaire.coms creditworthiness, Leiter told Strong that;MallorBarnesBowersLangvardt;Business Law: The Ethical;Global, and ECommerce;Environment, 13th Edition;III. Contracts;The McGrawHill;Companies, 2007;16. Writing;Chapter Sixteen Writing;397;Wintersport would only extend credit to if paid a $10,000 down payment and White personally guaranteed the balance due. During a phone call between their respective offices in Washington and South Carolina;Leiter requested and received Whites oral agreement to the personal guaranty. Leiter then sent a confirming fax to Whites;office, and White expressmailed to Wintersport a $10,000 check drawn on Millionaire.coms account. When;failed to pay the amount due on the contract, Wintersport filed suit against White and others.;The trial court entered judgment in Wintersports favor against and White. White appealed, arguing that;the action should have been dismissed because the statute of frauds prevented the enforcement of his oral guaranty.;Coleman, Judge;The statute of frauds provides that every special promise;to answer for the debt, default, or misdoings of another;person must be in writing. There is a distinction, however, between original promises, which do not fall within;the statute, and collateral promises, which do. Wintersport argues that Whites oral guaranty is outside the;statute of frauds because White received a personal benefit from the guaranty due to his interest in continuing the;business of White argues, however, that;standing alone, ownership of stock is insufficient to support a finding that his promise was original. An original;promise occurs when the promisor receives some consideration or direct benefit from the promise. If the leading object is to benefit the promisor, it does not matter if;the effect of the promise is to pay the debt of another. A;frequent scenario in which courts enforce oral original;promises is when promisors agree to be billed directly for;services provided to a third party. White contends that;this case presents the classic example of an unenforceable promise in which a promisor agrees to pay the debts;of another if that party fails to pay.;Smith v. Twohy held that in such circumstances a showing of direct benefit is necessary to take the promise out;of the statute of frauds. Twohy further held that the benefits accruing as incidents of stock ownership are insuffi-;Interest in Land;Any contract that creates or;transfers an interest in land is within the statute of frauds.;The inclusion of real estate contracts in the statute of;frauds reflects the values of an earlier, agrarian society in;which land was the primary basis of wealth. Our legal;system historically has treated land as being more important than other forms of property. Courts have interpreted the land provision of the statute of frauds broadly;to require written evidence of any transaction that will affect the ownership of an interest in land. Thus, a contract;to sell or mortgage real estate must be evidenced by a;writing, as must an option to purchase real estate or a;contract to grant an easement or permit the mining and;removal of minerals on land. A lease is also a transfer of;cient to show a direct benefit. The direct benefit inquiry;here is the sole criteria for determining whether the;promise was original or collateral. This case presents a situation where White promises to pay if;does not, but under Twohy, mere status as a shareholder is;insufficient to take this kind of promise out of the statute;of frauds. Wintersport has not shown that Whites benefit;amounted to anything more than an indirect incident of;share ownership. Although White owned stock in, there is not substantial evidence to support;the trial courts findings that White received a personal;benefit from Millionaire.coms successful completion of;the printing contract with Wintersport.;At trial, Wintersport argued that Millionaire.coms future and Whites job depended on the success of Opulence and that White received a substantial benefit to his;company by entering into a guaranty. There is, however;no direct evidence of this. White describes Wintersports;claims as speculative, and he is correct. The record is;devoid of any evidence that could support these arguments. Since the burden was on Wintersport to prove the;benefit White received and it failed to sustain its burden;we conclude that Whites oral guaranty fell within the;statute of frauds.;Reversed and dismissed in favor of White.;an interest in land, but most states statutes of frauds do;not require leases to be in writing unless they are longterm leases, usually those for one year or more. On the;other hand, a contract to erect a building or to insure a;building would not be within the real estate provision of;the statute of frauds because such contracts do not involve the transfer of interests in land.1;Exception: Full Performance by the Vendor An oral;contract for the sale of land that has been completely;performed by the vendor (seller) is taken out of the;1;Note, however, that a writing might be required under state insurance;statutes.;MallorBarnesBowersLangvardt;Business Law: The Ethical;Global, and ECommerce;Environment, 13th Edition;III. Contracts;398;Part Three Contracts;statute of fraudsthat is, is enforceable without a writing. For example, Peterson and Lincoln enter into an oral;contract for the sale of Petersons farm at an agreed-on;price and Peterson, the vendor, delivers a deed to the;farm to Lincoln. In this situation, the vendor has completely performed and most states would treat the oral;contract as being enforceable.;Exception: Part Performance (Action in Reliance) by;the Vendee When the vendee (purchaser of land) does;an act in clear reliance on an oral contract for the sale of;land, an equitable doctrine commonly known as the part;performance doctrine permits the vendee to enforce the;contract notwithstanding the fact that it was oral. The part;performance doctrine is based on both evidentiary and reliance considerations. The doctrine recognizes that a persons conduct can speak louder than words and can;indicate the existence of a contract almost as well as a writing can. The part performance doctrine is also based on the;desire to avoid the injustice that would otherwise result if;the contract were repudiated after the vendees reliance.;Under section 129 of the Restatement (Second) of;Contracts, a contract for the transfer of an interest in land;can be enforced even without a writing if the person seeking enforcement;1. Has reasonably relied on the contract and on the other;partys assent.;2. Has changed his position to such an extent that enforcement of the contract is the only way to prevent;injustice.;In other words, the vendee must have done some act;in reliance on the contract and the nature of the act must;be such that restitution (returning his money) would not;be an adequate remedy. The part performance doctrine;will not permit the vendee to collect damages for breach;of contract, but it will permit him to obtain the equitable;remedy of specific performance, a remedy whereby the;court orders the breaching party to perform his contract.2;A vendees reliance on an oral contract could be;shown in many ways. Traditionally, many states have required that the vendee pay part or all of the purchase;price and either make substantial improvements on the;property or take possession of it. For example, Contreras;and Miller orally enter into a contract for the sale of Contrerass land. If Miller pays Contreras a substantial part of;the purchase price and either takes possession of the land;or begins to make improvements on it, the contract would;be enforceable without a writing under the part perfor2;Specific performance is discussed in more detail in Chapter 18.;The McGrawHill;Companies, 2007;16. Writing;mance doctrine. These are not the only sorts of acts in reliance that would make an oral contract enforceable;however. Under the Restatement (Second) approach, if;the promise to transfer land is clearly proven or is admitted by the breaching party, it is not necessary that the act;of reliance include making payment, taking possession;or making improvements.3 It still is necessary, however;that the reliance be such that restitution would not be an;adequate remedy. For this reason, a vendees payment of;the purchase price, standing alone, is usually not sufficient for the part performance doctrine.;Contracts That Cannot Be Performed;within One Year A bilateral, executory contract;that cannot be performed within one year from the day on;which it comes into existence is within the statute of;frauds and must be evidenced by a writing. The apparent;purpose of this provision is to guard against the risk of;faulty or willfully inaccurate recollection of long-term;contracts. Courts have tended to construe it very narrowly.;One aspect of this narrow construction is that most;states hold that a contract that has been fully performed;by one of the parties is taken out of the statute of frauds;and is enforceable without a writing. For example, Nash;enters into an oral contract to perform services for;Thomas for 13 months. If Nash has already fully performed his part of the contract, Thomas will be required;to pay him the contract price.;In addition, this provision of the statute has been held;to apply only when the terms of the contract make it impossible for the contract to be completed within one year.;You will see an example of this principle in the Professional Bull Riders case, which follows. If the contract is;for an indefinite period of time, it is not within the statute;of frauds. This is true even if, in retrospect, the contract;was not completed within a year. Thus, Weinbergs agreement to work for Wolf for an indefinite period of time;would not have to be evidenced by a writing, even if;Weinberg eventually works for Wolf for many years. The;mere fact that performance is unlikely to be completed in;one year does not bring the contract within the statute of;frauds. In most states, a contract for life is not within;the statute of frauds because it is possiblesince death is;an uncertain eventfor the contract to be performed;within a year. In a few states such as New York, contracts;for life are within the statute of frauds.;Computing Time In determining whether a contract is;within the one-year provision, courts begin counting;3;Restatement (Second) of Contracts 129, comment d.;MallorBarnesBowersLangvardt;Business Law: The Ethical;Global, and ECommerce;Environment, 13th Edition;III. Contracts;The McGrawHill;Companies, 2007;16. Writing;Chapter Sixteen Writing;time on the day when the contract comes into existence.;If, under the terms of the contract, it is possible to perform it within one year from this date, the contract does;not fall within the statute of frauds and does not have to;be in writing. If, however, the terms of the contract;make it impossible to complete performance of the contract (without breaching it) within one year from the;date on which the contract came into existence, the contract falls within the statute and must meet its require-;399;ments to be enforceable. Thus, if Hammer Co. and McCrea agree on August 1, 2006, that McCrea will work;for Hammer Co. for one year, beginning October 1;2006, the terms of the contract dictate that it is not possible to complete performance until October 1, 2007.;Because that date is more than one year from the date;on which the contract came into existence, the contract;falls within the statute of frauds and must be evidenced;by a writing to be enforceable.;Professional Bull Riders, Inc. v. AutoZone, Inc.;2005 Colo. LEXIS 559 (Colo. Sup. Ct. 2005);For several years, AutoZone sponsored events conducted by Professional Bull Riders (PBR). For the years 2001 and 2002;PBR prepared a written agreement to provide for AutoZones sponsorship. Section I of that agreement states;The term of this agreement shall commence as of December 29, 2000 and end on December 31, 2002, unless terminated earlier in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement. Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, AutoZone may, at its option, elect to terminate this Agreement and its sponsorship of PBR and the Series effective as;of the end of the Finals in 2001, by giving PBR written notice of termination by no later than August 15, 2001.;AutoZone never signed this agreement. However PBR alleges that by its actions, AutoZone tacitly accepted its terms set;forth in the proposed written agreement and that, as a result, the parties entered into an oral agreement on the terms set forth;in writing. In January 2002, AutoZone notified PBR that AutoZone would not be sponsoring PBR events in 2002. However;despite this notice, PBR allegedly continued to use AutoZones trademark and service mark in connection with its programs.;PBR then sued AutoZone in U.S. District Court for breach of the oral sponsorship agreement. The district court granted;summary judgment to AutoZone, reasoning that the oral contract could not be performed within one year and was therefore;unenforceable under the statute of frauds. PBR appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which certified;the following questions about Colorado law to the Colorado Supreme Court;Is an oral agreement void when: (1) the agreement contemplates performance for a definite period of more than one;year but (2) allows the party to be charged an option to terminate the agreement by a certain date less than a year;from the making of the agreement and when (3) the party to be charged has not exercised that option to terminate;the agreement?;Coats, Justice;Colorado enacted the one-year provision of the statute of;frauds in 1861, drawing heavily from the English statute;and the language of that provision has never been;amended. We have long construed the one-year provision;narrowly, to bring within the statute only those agreements that exclude, by their very terms, the possibility of;performance within one year. That an agreement was not;actually performed within one year of its making is, by;this construction, clearly of no consequence in determining the applicability of the statute of frauds. As described;by the Tenth Circuit, the agreement that is the subject of;its certification required AutoZone to sponsor PBR and;the Series. With regard to the length of AutoZones required sponsorship, however, the agreement provided an;election. By its own terms, the sponsorship agreement;was to run for two seasons, unless sooner terminated as;contemplated by the agreement itself. The agreement then;expressly left to AutoZone the choice to terminate not;only the agreement, but also its obligation of sponsorship;effective upon the conclusion of only one season. While;the agreement was couched in terms of an agreement to;sponsor for two seasons, with an option to terminate after;sponsoring for only one season, it cannot be reasonably;understood as other than an agreement of sponsorship for;either one or two seasons, at AutoZones choice. The;agreement did not purport to grant AutoZone an option to;terminate the agreement at will or upon the occurrence of;some particular event, rather it provided AutoZone with;two alternative ways of satisfying its obligations as contemplated by the agreement. Although the agreement contemplated performance for two seasons (a definite period;MallorBarnesBowersLangvardt;Business Law: The Ethical;Global, and ECommerce;Environment, 13th Edition;III. Contracts;400;The McGrawHill;Companies, 2007;16. Writing;Part Three Contracts;of more than one year), if AutoZone chose that option, it;also contemplated that AutoZone could completely perform its obligation by sponsoring PBR for one full season.;Whether or not AutoZone effectively elected its option to;limit its sponsorship obligation to only one season, the;agreement expressly provided, by its own terms, an alter-;native performance that could be completed in less than;one year. The one-year provision therefore does not bring;such an agreement within the statute of frauds. We therefore answer the certified question in the negative.;Sale of Goods for $500 or More;provides that contracts for the sale of goods for the price;of $500 or more are not enforceable without a writing or;other specified evidence that a contract was made. There;are a number of alternative ways of satisfying the requirements of section 2201. These will be explained;later in this chapter.;The original English Statute of Frauds required a writing for contracts for the sale of goods for a price of 10 pounds;sterling or more. In the United States today, the writing;requirement for the sale of goods is governed by section;2201 of the Uniform Commercial Code. This section;Certified question answered in favor of PBR.;CONCEPT REVIEW;Contracts within the Statute of Frauds;Provision;Description;Exceptions (Situations in Which Contract;Does Not Require a Writing);Marriage;Contracts, other than mutual;promises to marry, where marriage;is the consideration;Year;Bilateral contracts that, by their;terms, cannot be performed;within one year from the date on;which the contract was formed;Full (complete) performance by;one of the parties;Land;Contracts that create or transfer an;ownership interest in real property;1. Full performance by vendor;(vendor deeds property to vendees);or;2. Part performance doctrine: Vendee;relies on oral contractfor example, by;a. Paying substantial part of purchase price;and;b. Taking possession or making;improvements;Executors Promise;Executor promises to pay estates;debt out of his own funds;Sale of Goods at;Price $500 or More;(UCC 2201);Contracts for the sale of goods for;a contract price of $500 or more;also applies to modifications of;contracts for goods where price as;modified is $500 or more;See alternative ways of satisfying statute of;frauds under UCC;Collateral Contracts;Guaranty;Contracts where promisor promises to;pay the debt of another if the primary;debtor fails to pay;Main purpose or leading object;exception: Guarantor makes promise;primarily for her own economic benefit;MallorBarnesBowersLangvardt;Business Law: The Ethical;Global, and ECommerce;Environment, 13th Edition;III. Contracts;The McGrawHill;Companies, 2007;16. Writing;Chapter Sixteen Writing;Modifications of Existing Sales Contracts Just as;some contracts to extend the time for performance fall;within the one-year provision of the statute of frauds;agreements to modify existing sales contracts can fall;within the statute of frauds if the contract as modified is;for a price of $500 or more.4 UCC section 2209(3) provides that the requirements of the statute of frauds must;be satisfied if the contract as modified is within its provisions. For example, if Carroll and Kestler enter into a;contract for the sale of goods at a price of $490, the original contract does not fall within the statute of frauds.;However, if they later modify the contract by increasing;the contract price to $510, the modification falls within;the statute of frauds and must meet its requirements to be;enforceable.;Promise of Executor or Administrator;to Pay a Decedents Debt Personally;When a person dies, a personal representative is appointed to administer his estate. One of the important;tasks of this personal representative, who is called an executor if the person dies leaving a will or an administrator if the person dies without a will, is to pay the debts;owed by the decedent. No writing is required when an executor or administratoracting in his representative;capacitypromises to pay the decedents debts from the;funds of the decedents estate. The statute of frauds requires a writing, however, if the executor, acting in her;capacity as a private individual rather than in her representative capacity, promises to pay one of the decedents;debts out of her own (the executors) funds. For example;Thomas, who has been appointed executor of his Uncle;Maxs estate, is prese


Paper#34795 | Written in 18-Jul-2015

Price : $37